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While the article Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting
Illegality' was set for publication, the Department of Defense formally
issued its first set of Procedures for Trials by Military Commission of
Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism.2 The
President's November 13th Military Order had set up several per se vio-
lations of international law.3 Instead of attempting to avoid them, the
DOD Order of March 21, 2002 continued the violations, set up addi-
tional violations of international law, and created various rules of
procedure and evidence that, if not per se violative of international law,
are highly problematic. What follows is a selective commentary on vari-
ous ad hoc' rules of procedure and evidence set forth in the DOD Order.
* Law Foundation Professor, University of Houston. A.B. (1965), J.D. (1968), UCLA;
LL.M. (1972), Univ. of Virginia; J.S.D. Cand., Yale Univ.; Faculty, U.S. Army TJAG School
(1969-1973).
1. Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 1 (2001).
2. Dep't of Def. Military Comm'n Order No. 1 (Mar. 21, 2002) [hereinafter DOD Or-
der], http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d2OO2O32 I ord.pdf.
3. See Paust, supra note 1, at 10-17, 25-26.
4. They are ad hoc because they can be changed at any time. DOD Order, supra note 2,
§§ 1, 7(A), 11.
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I. SEVERAL SERIOUS VIOLATIONS HAVE BEEN CONTINUED
The present DOD rules continue intentional and per se discrimina-
tion on the basis of national or social origin,5 intentional and per se
denial of equal protection,6 and "denial of justice" to aliens in violation
of various international laws . Nearly every impropriety concerning the
Peruvian military commissions addressed by the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights has been built into the Bush military commissions In
particular, under the DOD Order, civilians may not be tried in civilian
courts, the accused have been detained for months without charges, de-
tainees do not enjoy the right to be brought promptly before a judge or to
file habeas corpus petitions, defense attorneys will lack access to some
witnesses, accused will not be able to cross-examine all witnesses
against them, portions of trials can be held in secret, and accused lack
the right of appeal to an independent and impartial tribunal. Further-
more, most of the customary minimum due process requirements
reflected, for example, in article 14 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights,9 have been spurned.' ° In particular, and as ex-
plained in part below, there will be a denial of a "fair and public hearing
5. See Paust, supra note I, at 17 & n.37, 25 (addressing the prohibition of national or
social origin discrimination under the U.N. Charter and customary human rights law); Michael
J. Kelly, Essay, Understanding September lth-An International Legal Perspective on the
War in Afghanistan, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 283, 289-90 (2002) ("The illegal nature of [Presi-
dent Bush's Military] order only serves to perpetuate a sense of unfairness.").
6. See Paust, supra note 1, at 17 & nn.38-39, 25 (addressing the prohibition of a denial
of equal protection under customary and treaty-based human rights law and bilateral treaties
of friendship, commerce, and navigation).
7. See id. at 12 & n.26, 25 (addressing the customary prohibition of "denial of justice"
to aliens and identifying various relevant examples).
8. Cf. id. at 10 & n.20 (discussing the opinion of the Inter-American Court and human
rights violations by Peruvian Military Commissions in the Castillo Petruzzi Case (Merits),
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., set. C, No. 52 (1999)).
9. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, 176 [hereinafter ICCPR]. Customary human rights to due process are also incorporated
by reference as nonderogable rights of all detainees, regardless of status, in common article
3(l )(d) of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Con-
dition of the Wounded and the Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3115, 3118, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 35; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded, Sick or Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 3222, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 88; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 138 [hereinafter GPW]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 290 [hereinafter Geneva Civilian Convention]; see, e.g.,
Paust, supra note 1, at 7 n.15, 12 n.26; see also ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO COMMANDER'S
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 490 n.47 (Naval War College, Int'l L. Stud-
ies vol. 73, A.R. Thomas and James C. Duncan eds., 1999) ("GPW is the universally accepted
standard for treatment of PWs; virtually all nations are party to it and it is now regarded as
reflecting customary law.").
10. See Paust, supra note 1, at 10-15 and references cited.
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by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law,"
detainees have not been "informed promptly and in detail ... of the na-
ture and cause" of any charges against them, an accused will not fully
enjoy the right to "counsel of his choosing," an accused will not fully
enjoy the right "[t]o be tried in his presence" or to "defend himself...
through legal assistance of his own choosing," an accused will not fully
enjoy the right "[tlo examine, or have examined, the witnesses against
him," and an accused will not enjoy "the right to his conviction and sen-
tence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law." As noted
below, various other due process guarantees under human rights law, the
laws of war, and other international laws will also be violated if the
DOD rules are followed.
II. DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DETENTION
The DOD rules reflect an intentional denial of the customary and
nonderogable human right to take proceedings before a court exercising
judicial power in order to determine the lawfulness of one's detention
and to order release of the person if detention is not lawful." For
example, no provision exists in the President's Military Order or the
DOD rules for review of detention by a federal district court. The only
"review" provided in the DOD rules involves perfunctory review of a
military commission's decision by the Appointing Authority 2 of the
record of trial to assure that the "proceedings of the Commission
11. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 9(4), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 176; European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 5(3)-
(4), 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 226; American Convention on Human Rights: Pact of San Josd, Costa
Rica, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 7(5)-(6), 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 147 (1969); American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man, arts. XVIII, XXV, XXVI, O.A.S. Res. XXX (1948), O.A.S.
Off. Rec. OEA/ser. L./V./I.4, rev. (1965); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 10,
G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948). Concerning nonderogability of this right,
see, for example, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 29, 73d Sess.,
1950th mtg. I 11, 16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.I 1 (2001); Amnesty Int'l, Memorandum
to the U.S. Government on the Rights of People in U.S. custody in Afghanistan and Guan-
tanamo Bay, 6 & n.16, 44-47 (Apr. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Amnesty Int'l, Memorandum],
available at http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc (discussing the prospect of indefinite detention
without trial or after acquittal); see also U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 63d Sess., 1694th
mtg. 21, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.93 (1998) (a state "may not depart from the require-
ment of effective judicial review of detention"). See generally supra note 9 and accompanying
text.
12. The Appointing Authority will be a "designee" of the Secretary of Defense: "In ac-
cordance with the President's Military Order, the Secretary of Defense or a designee
('Appointing Authority') may issue orders from time to time appointing one or more military
commissions to try individuals subject to the President's Military Order and appointing any
other personnel necessary to facilitate such trials." DOD Order, supra note 2, § 2.
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were administratively complete,'"3  possible limited "review" and
"recommendations" to the Secretary of Defense by a Review Panel of
military officers (only one of whom presumably must be a lawyer since
only one of the members of the panel must "have experience as a
judge"), 4 and "review" by the Secretary of Defense'" with "final
decision" by the Secretary of Defense or the President.'6 The Review
Panel may not overturn a conviction, reverse or amend a decision, or
order dismissal or release of the person (or order anything else), since it
"shall either (a) forward the case to the Secretary of Defense with a
recommendation as to disposition, or (b) return the case to the
Appointing Authority for further proceedings" if a majority of the Panel
(which could be the non-lawyer officers) decides "that a material error of
law occurred."'' 7 Section 7(B) of the DOD rules also attempts to assure
that there will be no other form of review, including habeas corpus
13. Id. § 6(H)(3).
"Review by the Appointing Authority. If the Secretary of Defense is not the Ap-
pointing Authority, the Appointing Authority shall promptly perform an
administrative review of the record of trial. If satisfied that the proceedings of the
Commission were administratively complete, the Appointing Authority shall trans-
mit the record of trial to the Review Panel constituted under Section 6(H)(4). If not
so satisfied, the Appointing Authority shall return the case for any necessary sup-
plementary proceedings."
Id.
14. This allows the one lawyer on a Review Panel to be overruled by non-lawyers review-
ing issues concerning the identity, interpretation, and application of relevant law and a
decision whether a "material error" of law occurred. Id. § 6(H)(4).
"The Secretary of Defense shall designate a Review Panel consisting of three Mili-
tary Officers, which may include civilians commissioned pursuant to reference (e).
At least one member of each Review Panel shall have experience as a judge. The
Review Panel shall review the record of trial and, in its discretion, any written sub-
missions from the Prosecution and the Defense and shall deliberate in closed
conference. The Review Panel shall disregard any variance from procedures speci-
fied in this Order or elsewhere that would not materially have affected the outcome
of the trial before the Commission. Within thirty days after receipt of the record of
trial, the Review Panel shall either (a) forward the case to the Secretary of Defense
with a recommendation as to disposition, or (b) return the case to the Appointing
Authority for further proceedings, provided that a majority of the Review Panel has
formed a definite and firm conviction that a material error of law occurred."
Id.
15. Id. § 6(H)(5).
"Review by the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense shall review the re-
cord of trial and the recommendations of the Review Panel and either return the
case for further proceedings or, unless making the final decision pursuant to a
Presidential designation under Section 4(c)(8) of the President's Military Order,
forward it to the President with a recommendation as to disposition."
Id.
16. Id, § 6(H)(2), (6).
17. ld. § 6(H)(4).
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review, since it provides that "[i]n the event of any inconsistency
between the President's Military Order and this Order... the provisions
of the President's Military Order shall govern,"'8 and the President's
Military Order openly attempted to preclude all judicial review,
including all access to Article III courts and any use of habeas corpus."
As noted previously, denial of the right to habeas corpus is imper-
missible under customary human rights law2° and also violates rights
under human rights and other international laws providing for equal pro-
tection." These denials are particularly serious with respect to possible
use of military commissions at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, because U.S.
military commissions have lawful jurisdiction only during war either in a
war zone or in war-related occupied territory22 and Guantanamo is
clearly outside any war zone or war-related occupied territory. 3
It may be shocking to some, but during an international armed
conflict or war-related occupation "a Party to the conflict" or an
occupying power, in its territory or in occupied territory, can intern
certain persons without trial if such persons are "definitely suspected of
or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the State. 24 Internment
18. Id. § 7(B).
19. See Paust, supra note 1, at 15 & n.34, 21 (addressing relevant language in the Mili-
tary Order and various human rights and laws of war at stake; referring to decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court of Canada, and the African Commission
on Human and Peoples' Rights; a U.N. Secretary-General report; and U.S. Dep't of State
Country Reports). International law and proper interpretation of the habeas corpus statute
require that habeas corpus remain available, despite the Bush Administration's attempt to deny
review and a recent district court ruling in accord. See discussion infra Section VII (comment-
ing on the district court opinion in Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (C.D.
Cal. 2002)).
20. See Paust, supra note 1, at 10; see also Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations, In-
ter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. A, No. 8, i 38, 41-42 (1987) ("[H]abeas corpus and... 'amparo' are
among those judicial remedies that are essential for the protection of various rights whose
derogation is prohibited."), addressed in RICHARD B. LILLICH & HURST HANNUM, INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 927-28 (3d ed. 1995).
21. See Paust, supra note 1, at 18, 21, 25-26.
22. See, e.g., id. at 5 & n.14, 26-27. For additional cases, see, e.g., Duncan v. Kaha-
namoku, 327 U.S. 304, 324 (1946) ("occupied enemy territory"); The Grapeshot, 76 U.S. (9
Wall.) 129, 132-33 (1869) ("wherever the insurgent's power was overthrown," "so long as the
war continued," "during war").
23. See Paust, supra note 1, at 25 & n.70, 26 (discussing the U.S.-Cuba treaty regime re-
garding Guantanamo Bay).
24. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 9, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. at 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. at
290. Guantanamo does not appear to be an appropriate territory within the meaning of article
5, since it is not technically U.S. territory, although it is close to such a status, and it is not
war-related occupied territory. See Paust, supra note 1, at 25 n.70. If so, detention at Guan-
tanamo would be impermissible. Moreover, transfer of non-prisoners of war out of any U.S.
occupied territory in Afghanistan would be a war crime. See, e.g., Geneva Civilian Conven-
tion, supra note 9, arts. 49, 76, 147, 6 U.S.T. at 3548, 3566, 3618, 75 U.N.T.S. at 319, 336,
388; Paust, supra note 1, at 24 n.68.
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without trial can last for the duration of the international armed conflict
or occupation,25 but detainees are to be released sooner if detention is no
longer required for definite security reasons. Release must occur upon
termination of the armed conflict or occupation and, in any event, "at the
earliest date consistent with the security of the State or Occupying Power
.... ,26 While such persons are being detained, "[i]n each case, such
persons shall nevertheless be treated with humanity, and in case of trial,
shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed by"
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of
War.27 Common article 3 is part of the Convention and now applies in all
armed conflicts, and thus customary human rights to due process that are
incorporated therein by reference supplement other due process
provisions contained in the Convention." Whether they are to be
prosecuted or merely detained as security threats, each detainee has a
right under customary human rights law to obtain judicial review of the
propriety of their detention. Moreover, persons detained by the United
States at Guantanamo or in Afghanistan who are suspected or accused of
crimes have not enjoyed the right to be informed promptly and in detail
of the nature and cause of any charges against them and to communicate
with counsel of their choosing.29
DOD statements concerning the goals of detainee internment and in-
terrogation have shifted between attempts to prosecute those accused of
crimes, attempts to detain certain persons as security threats, and at-
tempts at information gathering for the purposes of prosecuting others or
for more general intelligence purposes. ° There are even suggestions that,
25. Geneva Civilian Convention, supra note 9, art. 6, 6 U.S.T. at 3522, 75 U.N.T.S. at 292
(application of the Convention in the territories of parties to the conflict, and thus rights and
competencies of the detaining power thereunder, "shall cease on the general close of military
operations").
26. See id. art. 5, 6 U.S.T. at 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290.
27. Id. Members of the armed forces of the Taliban should be treated as prisoners of war
under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. GPW, supra note
9, 6 U.S.T. at 3320-22, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138-40. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 7 n.15. Pris-
oners of war are to be "released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active
hostilities" GPW, supra note 9, art. 118, 6 U.S.T. at 3406, 75 U.N.T.S. at 224. However, pris-
oners of war may be detained if they are being lawfully prosecuted or have been lawfully
convicted of crimes and are serving a sentence. Id. art. 119, 6 U.S.T. at 3408, 75 U.N.T.S. at
226; see id. arts. 85, 99, 129, 6 U.S.T. at 3384, 3392, 3418, 75 U.N.T.S at 202, 210, 236;
United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1526 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
28. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text; Amnesty Int'l, Memorandum, su-
pra note 11, at 28-30.
30. See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l, Memorandum, supra note 11, at 28-29, 43-46; Warren
Richey, How Evidence Stacks Up on Military Tribunals, CHRISTIAN SCi. MONITOR, Mar. 22,
2002, at 3; Carol Rosenberg, Base's New Chief Calls Captives 'Killers', MIAMI HERALD, Apr.
10, 2002, at 9A (General says Pentagon guidelines for detainees 'not really' of concern);
Katharine Q. Seelye, Pentagon Says Acquittals May Not Free Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22,
[Vol. 23:677
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given the lack of sufficient evidence for prosecution of many of the de-
tainees for crimes, they should be interned without trial or judicial
review for as long as they are "dangerous."3' One problem with such a
strategy is that detention of non-prisoners of war authorized under the
Geneva Civilian Convention and detention of prisoners of war must end
when the international armed conflict in Afghanistan ends . The United
States cannot be at "war" with al Qaeda as such,33 there or in other coun-
tries. The threshold of "armed conflict" under common article 2 of the
Geneva Conventions, which triggers application of the detaining power's
competence under article 5 of the Geneva Civilian Convention to intern
certain persons, cannot be met if the United States is merely fighting
members of al Qaeda. Other problems for those seeking prosecution in-
clude the fact that (1) mere membership in an organization (like al
Qaeda) is not a crime;34 (2) acts of warfare engaged in by members of the
armed forces of a party to an international armed conflict (begun on Oc-
tober 7, 2001, in Afghanistan) are entitled to immunity from prosecution
if their acts are not otherwise violative of international law3 and, thus,
2002, at A13 [hereinafter Seelye, Pentagon]; Katharine Q. Seelye, Rumsfeld Backs Plan to
Hold Captives Even ifAcquitted, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2002, at A 12; see also infra note 31 and
accompanying text. One news report states that the United States is not releasing the names of
detainees or even confirming names identified by countries of nationality of the detained per-
sons. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, Moscow, Seeking Extradition, Says 3 Detainees Are
Russian, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2002, at All. The InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) Commentary recognizes that the detaining power has obligations to transmit "particu-
lars of any protected person who is kept in custody for more than two weeks" to an official
Information Bureau, which does not exist but some of whose functions can be performed by
the ICRC. See 4 INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY, GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 56 (Jean S. Pictet &
ICRC eds., Major Ronald Griffin et al. trans., 1958) [hereinafter 4 ICRC COMMENTARY].
31. See, e.g., Warren Richey, How Long Can Guantanamo Prisoners Be Held?, CHRIS-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 9, 2002, 1, 4 (quoting Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen. John Yoo: "Does it
make sense to ever release them if you think they are going to continue to be dangerous even
though you can't convict them of a crime?"); Stuart Taylor, Al Qaeda Detainees: Don't Prose-
cute, Don't Release, 34 NAT'L J. 1203 (2002).
32. See supra notes 25, 27 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 8 n.16 (noting that bin Laden was not the leader of a
State, nation, belligerent, or insurgent group; that al Qaeda did not meet even the criteria
needed for insurgent status; and that war or armed conflict between the United States and al
Qaeda can only occur under international law if al Qaeda has the status of a belligerent or
insurgent); see also Pan American Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 505 F.2d
989, 1013-15 (2d Cir. 1974) (United States could not have been at war with the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine, which had engaged in terrorist acts as a non-State, non-
belligerent, and non-insurgent actor).
34. See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL LAW 43-46 (2d ed. 2000) and references cited.
35. This is a form of "combat immunity" with respect to lawful acts of warfare. See, e.g.,
In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 47 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("we have no question here of
what the military might have done in a field of combat .... The purpose of battle is to kill.");
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES 1I-111 (2000) (Rule 916(c), discussion:
Spring 2002]
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"killing an enemy combatant in battle is justified"); FRANCOISE BOUCHET-SAULNIER, THE
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO HUMANITARIAN LAW 50 (2002) ("Combatants are persons who are
authorized to use force. As long as their use of force is in conformity with the provisions of
the laws of war, they may not be subject to criminal pursuit."); MYRES S. McDOUGAL &
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 712 (1961) ("[A]cts
committed in war by enemy civilians and members of armed forces may be punished as
crimes under a belligerent's municipal law only to the extent that such acts are violative of the
international law on the conduct of hostilities. Clearly the rule of warfare would be pointless
... if every single act of war may by unilateral municipal fiat be made a common crime and
every prisoner of war executed as a murderer. International law delineates the outer limits of
the liability of supposed war criminals; and conformity with that law affords a complete de-
fense for the violent acts charged."); TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN
AMERICAN TRAGEDY 19-20 (1970) ("War consists largely of acts that would be criminal if
performed in time of peace .... Such conduct is not regarded as criminal if it takes place in
the course of war, because the state of war lays a blanket of immunity over the warriors. But
the area of immunity is not unlimited, and its boundaries are marked by the laws of war."); see
also European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra note 11, art. 15(2), 213
U.N.T.S. at 232 (derogations from the "right to life" are permissible "in respect of deaths
resulting from lawful acts of war"); United States v. List, I I TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BE-
FORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, 757,
1236, 1246 (1950); United States v. Ohlendorf, 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, 1,492-93 (1949)
("Many of the defendants seem to assume that by merely characterizing a person a partisan, he
may be shot out of hand. But it is not so simple as that. If the partisans are organized and are
engaged in what international law regards as legitimate warfare ... they are entitled to be
protected as combatants .... The language used in the official German reports ... show[s],
however, that combatants were indiscriminately punished only for having fought against the
enemy. This is contrary to the laws of war."); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506,
1529 (S.D. Fla. 1990) ("the essential purpose of [GPW] is to protect prisoners of war from
prosecution for conduct which is customary in armed conflict," not "to provide immunity
against prosecution for common crimes committed against the detaining power before the
outbreak of hostilities" or "activities which have no bearing on the conduct of battle or the
defense of country"); Arce v. State, 202 S.W. 951, 953 (Tex. Crim. App. 1918) (four soldiers
under command of the de facto government of Mexico who killed a U.S. Army corporal during
hostilities could not be lawfully convicted for such conduct); United States v. Calley, 22 C.M.A.
534, 540 (1973) ("[I]t is lawful to kill an enemy in the heat and exercise of war....") (quoting
Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocate General of the Army 1074-75 n.3 (1912));
U.S. ARMY TJAG SCHOOL, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 12 (2002), at http://
www.jagcnet.army.mil ("Combatants. Anyone engaging in hostilities in an armed conflict on
behalf of a party to the conflict .... Lawful Combatants. Receive protections of Geneva Conven-
tions ... gain 'combatant immunity' for their warlike acts .. ); ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 9, at 490 n.47 ("The
rights and obligations of PWs are detailed in GPW. The Convention's underlying philosophy is
that PWs should not be punished merely for having engaged in armed conflict."); ANNOTATED
SUPPLEMENT TO COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 9,
at 492 ("Prisoners of war may not be punished for hostile acts directed against opposing forces
prior to capture, unless those acts constituted violations of the law of armed conflict.");
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD,
GENERAL ORDERS No. 100, at 15 (Prepared by Francis Lieber, 1863) [hereinafter Lieber
Code] (art. 49: "[a]ll soldiers, of whatever species of arms; all men who belong to the rising en
masse of the hostile country; all those who are attached to the army for its efficiency and pro-
mote directly the object of the war ... are prisoners of war...."); Lieber Code, supra, at 17
(art. 56: "[a] prisoner of war is subject to no punishment for being a public enemy," and art.
57: "[s]o soon as a man is armed by a sovereign government and takes the soldier's oath of
[Vol. 23:677
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lawful combat training and actions of members of the armed forces of
the Taliban (and perhaps members of al Qaeda units attached to the
armed forces of the Taliban) during the armed conflict in Afghanistan are
privileged belligerent acts entitled to combat immunity and cannot prop-
erly be criminal, elements of a domestic crime, or acts of an alleged
conspiracy; and (3) al Qaeda attacks on the United States on September
11 th (before the international armed conflict in Afghanistan began) can-
not be privileged belligerent acts but also cannot be prosecuted as war
crimes because the United States and al Qaeda cannot be "at war" under
international law.36
III. DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO REVIEW BY A COMPETENT,
INDEPENDENT, AND IMPARTIAL COURT
The preceding violations are also relevant to the more general and
blatant denial of the customary and nonderogable right to appeal to a
competent, independent, and impartial court.37 No such right of appeal
fidelity, he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts, are not individual
crimes or offenses."); THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 68 (Di-
eter Fleck ed., 1995) (mere civilians who are not members of the armed forces can be
prosecuted for unlawful or unprivileged participation in an armed conflict); 4 ICRC COMMEN-
TARY, supra note 30, at 53 ("irregular combatants" are "[t]hose who take part in the struggle
while not belonging to the armed forces [and] are acting deliberately outside the laws of war-
fare."); 3 INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY, GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE
TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 417-22 (Jean S. Pictet & ICRC eds., A.P de He-
ney trans., 1960) (precapture offenses for which a prisoner of war can be prosecuted under
domestic law include only (1) acts not part of or related to the armed conflict, and (2) acts
related to the conflict that constitute war crimes, crimes against peace, or crimes against hu-
manity); Major Geoffrey S. Korn & Major Michael L. Schmidt, "To Be Or Not To Be, That Is
The Question": Contemporary Military Operations and The Status of Captured Personnel,
ARMY LAW., June 1999 at 1, 14 (combatants, as privileged belligerents, are entitled to "a blan-
ket of immunity for their pre-capture warlike acts"); Georg Schwarzenberger, Human Rights
and Guerrilla Warfare, 1 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 246, 246 (1971); Waldemar A. Solf & Edward
R. Cummings, A Survey of Penal Sanctions Under Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of
August 12, 1949, 9 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 205, 212 (1977) ("those who are entitled to the
juridical status of 'privileged combatant' are immune from criminal prosecution for those
warlike acts which do not violate the laws and customs of war but which might otherwise be
common crimes under municipal law'); Solf & Cummings, supra, at 215 n.54 ("Those who
are properly entitled to prisoner of war status receive this immunity."). Article 56 of the Lieber
Code was applied during the Civil War and even prohibits prosecution for treason or other
crimes against the State. Lieber Code, supra, at 17.
36. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 8 n.16; see also supra note 33 and accompanying
text.
37. See Paust, supra note 1, at 12 n.26, 15, 25-26; LEILA NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 241, 250-51
(2002); supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also Margaret Graham Tebo, Qualified
Praise: ABA Reps See Things They Like in Tribunal Rules, Still Have Some Legal Concerns,
A.B.A. J., May 2002, at 59 [hereinafter Tebo, ABA Reps] (Neal R. Sonnet, chair of the ABA
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exists under either the President's Military Order or the DOD Order. In-
deed, a "Review Panel" under the DOD rules consists of three military
officers who generally remain under orders from the President, the DOD,
and various others within the military who have command authority. As
noted above, presumably only one member of the Review Panel must be
a lawyer, since only one member must "have experience as a judge." The
Review Panel, a majority of whom might be non-lawyer officers, is also
under specific orders to "disregard any variance from procedures speci-
fied in this [DOD] Order or elsewhere that would not materially have
affected the outcome of the trial before the Commission."38 The Panel
does not have the power to order, reverse, or amend anything and its
"recommendations" are subject to "review" merely by the Secretary of
Defense or the President. What has been set up is, thus, hardly a system
for fair, competent, meaningful, impartial, viable appellate review by a
competent, independent, and impartial court of law or tribunal exercising
judicial functions. The DOD system does not even pretend to match the
normal appellate process available in the U.S. military justice system,
which may include review by a court of criminal appeals, further review
by a court of appeals of the Armed Forces, and further possible review
(by habeas corpus or otherwise in Article III courts). Moreover, section
7(B) of the DOD Order might actually preclude use of the "Review
Panel," since even use of such a Panel is inconsistent with the President's
Military Order, which requires review only by the Secretary or the
President.39
Criminal Justice Section, expressed concerns over the lack of "appeals to a civilian court" and
Evan A. Davis, President of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, stated, "We
feel that it's very important that the final word rest with Article III judges as the Constitution
provides.").
38. DOD Order, supra note 2, § 6(H)(4). In sharp contrast, the Appeals Chamber of the
International Criminal Court can reverse or amend a decision or sentence or order a new trial
if it "finds that the proceedings appealed from were unfair in a way that affected the reliability
of the decision or sentence, or that the decision or sentence appealed from was materially
affected by error of fact or law or procedural error." Rome Statute of the International Crimi-
nal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 83(2), U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9, available at http://
www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm. As noted, the Bush military Review Panel can only
"return" a case to the "Appointing Authority" if a majority of the panel (who could be non-
lawyers) decides that "a material error of law occurred" and the panel is ordered to disregard
any variance from procedures that would "not materially have affected the outcome." See
DOD Order, supra note 2, § 6(H)(4).
39. See Paust, supra note 1, at 15.
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IV. DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BEFORE A REGULARLY
CONSTITUTED, COMPETENT, INDEPENDENT, AND IMPARTIAL
TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED BY LAW
Prosecution before the military commissions will also constitute de-
nial of the customary and nonderogable right to prosecution before a
regularly constituted, competent, independent, and impartial tribunal
established according to law.0 Under the DOD rules, military commis-
sions "shall consist of at least three but no more than seven members,
4
'1
all of whom must be military officers, 2 and only one of whom, the
"Presiding Officer," must be a lawyer.43 Under the rules, there is no pro-
cedure for challenging a member of the commission for cause, although
the "Appointing Authority may remove members or alternative members
for good cause."" The Presiding Officer shall admit evidence that he or
she considers "would have probative value to a reasonable person," but a
majority of the commission (all of whom could be non-lawyers) can
overrule the Presiding Officer on such questions.45 The majority of the
members of the commission could be under chains of command outside
the chain of command that exists for lawyers within the Judge Advocate
40. See, e.g., id. at 10-13, 15 n.34, 17 n.39; Amnesty Int'l, Memorandum, supra note 11,
at 53-54 & n.198 ("an absolute right that may suffer no exception") (quoting Gonzalez del
Rio v. Peru (263/1987), Oct. 28, 1992, Report of the Human Rights Committee, vol. II, at 20,
U.N. Doc. A/48/1993 (1993)); Report of the Human Rights Committee, supra, at 25-26.
41. DOD Order, supra note 2, § 4(A)(2). "Number of Members. Each Commission shall
consist of at least three but no more that seven members, the number being determined by the
Appointing Authority. For each such Commission, there shall also be one or two alternate
members, the number being determined by the Appointing Authority." Id.
42. Id. § 4(A)(3).
"Qualifications. Each member and alternate member shall be a commissioned offi-
cer of the United States armed forces ("Military Officer"), including without
limitation reserve personnel on active duty, National Guard personnel on active duty
in Federal service, and retired personnel recalled to active duty. The Appointing Au-
thority shall appoint members and alternate members determined to be competent
to perform the duties involved. The Appointing Authority may remove members
and alternate members for good cause."
Id.
43. Id. § 4(A)(4). "Presiding Officer. From among the members of each Commission, the
Appointing Authority shall designate a Presiding Officer to preside over the proceedings of
that Commission. The Presiding Officer shall be a Military Officer who is a judge advocate of
any United States armed force." Id.
44. Id. § 4(A)(3).
45. Id. § 6(D)(1).
"Admissibility. Evidence shall be admitted if, in the opinion of the Presiding Officer
(or instead, if any other member of the Commission so requests at the time the Pre-
siding Officer renders that opinion, the opinion of the Commission rendered at that
time by a majority of the Commission), the evidence would have probative value to
a reasonable person."
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Generals' Corps; and, in any event, all members of the commission will
be subject to lawful military orders, lawful portions of the DOD Order
and the President's Military Order, and lawful portions of other orders of
the President. 6 The deliberate plan is that military commissions will not
be constituted or operate in the same manner as general courts-martial
and conviction and sentencing can be approved by a percentage of mem-
bers of a commission that is less than that required in federal district
courts or courts-martial," thus constituting a denial of equal protection
as required by international law. The lack of minimum procedural guar-
antees strictly required by international law also assures that the military
commissions have not been designed to be fair, competent, independent,
and impartial tribunals.
V. DENIAL OF THE RIGHTS TO FAIR PROCEDURE
AND FAIR RULES OF EVIDENCE
With respect to procedural guarantees, the-DOD rules permit hear-
say, unsworn written statements, and other evidence that would be
inadmissible in U.S. federal courts or courts-martial and deny the right
to confrontation or examination of all witnesses against an accused. The
chair of the ABA Criminal Justice Section has expressed criticism,
shared by other ABA representatives, of "the decision to relax the rules
of evidence so as to admit anything 'that a reasonable person would find
probative.' , Cross-examination of witnesses against the accused is only
46. See Paust, supra note 1, at 15 n.34 (regarding relevant British and Canadian military
justice system violations of human rights and denial of justice); Morris v. United Kingdom, 34
Eur. Ct. H.R. 52, para. 75 (2002) ("risk of outside pressure being brought to bear on the two
relatively junior serving officers who sat on the applicant's court-martial ... [who] had no
legal training ... [and] remained subject to army discipline and reports" were factors contrib-
uting to the lack of independence and impartiality in violation of article 6(I) of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms).
47. See DOD Order, supra note 2, § 6(F)-(G). A two-thirds vote will suffice "except that
a sentence of death requires a unanimous affirmative vote of all of the members." Id. § 6(F).
However, this scheme is inconsistent with the President's Military Order, which would allow
imposition of a death sentence by a two-thirds vote. See Paust, supra note I, at 18 n.39. Thus,
section 7(B) of the DOD Order, stating that the President's Military Order "shall govern" in
the event of any inconsistency, seems to require use of merely a two-thirds vote for any sort of
conviction and sentencing. DOD Order, supra note 2, § 7(B).
48. Tebo, ABA Reps, supra note 37, at 59. Section 6(D)(1) of the DOD Order provides
the focus for this criticism. DOD Order, supra note 2, § 6(D)(I); see also National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL), Resolution of the Board of Directors (May 4, 2002),
available at http://www.nacdl.org ("[T]he procedures announced ... on March 21, 2002, are
... inadequate as a matter of fundamental fairness" and "do not comply with the provisions of
the Manual for Courts-Martial."). Also consider the remarks of Don Rehkopf, Co-Chair of the
Military Law Committee of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, in Seelye,
Pentagon, supra note 30 (rules of the tribunals are stacked against the defendants).
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authorized with respect to witnesses "who appear before the Commis-
sion. 49 Witnesses can also provide testimony "by telephone, audiovisual
means, or other means,' 50 thus placing in jeopardy the rights of confron-
tation and cross-examination of witnesses. Confrontation and cross-
examination are also jeopardized by allowance of witness testimony by
"introduction of prepared declassified summaries of evidence, '5' "testi-
mony from prior trials and proceedings, 5 2 "sworn [and even] unsworn
written statements" 53 and "reports. 5 4 Such rules of procedure and evi-
dence are clearly contrary to customary human rights law and other
international laws concerning confrontation and examination of wit-
nesses which require, at a minimum, that every accused have the right
"[tlo examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain
the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the
same conditions as witnesses against him."5
49. DOD Order, supra note 2, § 5(l) ("The Accused may have Defense Counsel present
evidence at trial in the Accused's defense and cross-examine each witness presented by the
Prosecution who appears before the Commission"); id. § 6(D)(2)(c) ("Examination of Wit-
nesses. A witness who testifies before the Commission is subject to both direct and cross-
examination'").
50. Id. § 6(D)(2)(a).
"Production of Witnesses. The Prosecution or the Defense may request that the
Commission hear testimony of any person, and such testimony shall be received if
found to be admissible and not cumulative. The Commission may also summon and
hear witnesses on its own initiative. The Commission may permit the testimony of
witnesses by telephone, audiovisual means, or other means; however, the Commis-
sion shall consider the ability to test the veracity of that testimony in evaluating
weight to be given to the testimony of the witness."
Id.
51. Id. § 6(D)(2)(d).
"Protection of Witnesses. The Presiding Officer shall consider the safety of wit-
nesses and others, as well as the safeguarding of Protected Information as defined
in Section 6(D)(5)(a), in determining the appropriate methods of receiving testi-
mony and evidence .... The Presiding Officer may authorize any methods
appropriate for the protection of witnesses and evidence. Such methods may in-
clude, but are not limited to: testimony by telephone, audiovisual means, or other
electronic means; closure of the proceedings; introduction of prepared declassified
summaries of evidence; and the use of pseudonyms."
Id.
52. Id. § 6(D)(3). "Other Evidence. Subject to the requirements of Section 6(D)(1) con-
cerning admissibility, the Commission may consider any other evidence including, but not
limited to, testimony from prior trials and proceedings, sworn or unsworn written statements,
physical evidence, or scientific or other reports." Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 14(3)(e), 999 U.N.T.S. at 176; Paust, supra note
1, at 10, 14 & n.32. The International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia has allowed
depositions, but the general rule is that a witness must be physically present before the Tribu-
nal. When depositions are used "in exceptional circumstances and in the interests of justice,"
there must be reasonable notice to the accused of a putative deposition, "who shall have the
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VI. DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND
TO EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION
The right of an accused to legal counsel of choice might be in jeop-
ardy by DOD rules providing that civilian attorneys of the accused's own
choosing must be a U.S. citizen; "must be admitted to the practice of law
in a [s]tate, district, territory, or possession of the United States, or be-
fore a Federal court;" and must have been "determined to be eligible for
access to information classified at the level of secret or higher.' 6 A JAG
officer will be assigned as a Detailed Defense Counsel for each ac-
cused,57 but civilian defense counsel can be precluded from "closed
Commission proceedings" and denied "access to any information pro-
tected under section 6(D)(5), 5 thus raising serious issues concerning
full enjoyment of the right to free choice of counsel and the right to be
tried in one's presence and to adequately defend oneself through legal
assistance of one's own choosing. 9
VII. A RECENT FEDERAL COURT DECISION
CONCERNING HABEAS CORPUS
At least one of the violations of international law discussed above
could be avoided through the proper involvement of Article III courts.
Although the Bush Administration has attempted to deny habeas corpus
review to the detainees at Guantanamo, in violation of international
law,6° a proper interpretation of the habeas corpus statute requires that
habeas corpus be available. A federal district court in California, how-
ever, has denied habeas corpus relief with respect to detainees at
right to attend the taking of the deposition and cross-examine the person whose deposition is
being taken," the witness testimony must be under oath and the witness must be informed
"that he is liable to prosecution for perjury in case of false testimony," and "testimony must be
given in the physical presence of the Presiding Officer [appointed by the Trial Chamber]
unless the chamber decides otherwise." Lal Chand Vohrah, Pre-trial Procedures and Prac-
tices, in I SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 479,
532-34 (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia Swaak-Goldman eds., 2000); see also Christine
Chinkin, The Protection of Victims and Witnesses, in 1 SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL As-
PECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra, at 451, 462 (accused must have "the
opportunity to confront and examine all witnesses").
56. DOD Order, supra note 2, § 4(C)(4).
57. See id. § 4(C)(2)-(4).
58. See id. §§ 4(C)(3), 6(B)(3), 6(D)(5).
59. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 10-14; Amnesty Int'l, Memorandum, supra note 11,
at 56-57. See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 963,967-68 (1996); GERT-JAN
G.J. KNoops, DEFENSES IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 221, 238-43
(2002).
60. See discussion supra Part II.
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Guantanamo,6' in part because of a peculiar reading of the statute.62 The
district court seemed to strain against the ordinary meaning of the word
"jurisdiction" and added a word that Congress had not chosen, i.e., the
word "territorial," as a limitation of "jurisdiction" or power.63 The district
court also focused on another word that Congress had not chosen to
place in the statute, the word "sovereignty."'
The statutory language simply cannot support such a perverse read-
ing. Indeed, the statute focuses on "jurisdiction" of courts, not territory
or sovereignty of the United States, and the district court seemed to con-
fuse the meaning of the statute with issues concerning the reach of the
Constitution. As noted, the statute expressly reaches violations of laws
other than the Constitution.
The district court stated that detainees at Guantanamo were at all
times outside the "sovereign territory" of the United States and that no
federal court can address a habeas petition unless Guantanamo Bay "is
under the sovereignty" of the United States, adding a conclusion that
"there is a difference between territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty
... .,,6 Of course, all that the statute requires is "jurisdiction." What the
court failed to address is that sovereignty is a form of lawful governmen-
tal power and that wherever the United States detains individuals, it is
61. Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 E Supp. 2d 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994). Relevant portions of the habeas corpus statute state that
"writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any [J]ustice thereof, the dis-
trict courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions" with respect to persons
"in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2241 (a), (c)(3). The phrase "laws... of the United States" will include customary interna-
tional law. See generally JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW As LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 5-9, 40-42 nn.44-45, passim (1996). Regarding treaties, see JORDAN J. PAUST, JOAN
M. FITZPATRICK & JON M. VAN DYKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S.
194 (2000) (habeas corpus statute executes treaties for habeas petition purposes).
63. Coalition of Clergy, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1049-50.
64. See id. This appears to be an attempt at judicial amendment of a federal statute in vio-
lation of the separation of powers.
65. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); see also Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660
(1892) (habeas to challenge the lawfulness of an act of Congress, validity of the act was up-
held under congressional power to forbid entrance into the United States to foreign persons);
Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1095 (9th Cir. 2001) (habeas claim that statute violated
ICCPR); Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 263-67 (5th Cir. 2001) (claim under human rights
treaty); Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 2000) (detainee claiming
human rights violation can bring habeas petition to challenge extradition); Beharry v. Reno,
183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 603-04 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (habeas claim for relief under principles of
international law). Another set of cases involves habeas claims of violation of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. See, e.g.,
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 373-75 (1998).
66. Coalition of Clergy, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1048.
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exercising a form of sovereign power.6 Additionally, Guantanamo Bay is
under the sovereign power and a form of territorial jurisdiction of the
United States: under a treaty with Cuba that confers "complete jurisdic-
tion and control over and within such areas"-and, thus, sovereignty-
and as an occupying power.6' The district court was also misleading in
stating that "'jurisdiction and control' is [not] equivalent to 'sover-
eignty'" because the treaty recognizes "complete" jurisdiction and
control in the United States, not merely "jurisdiction and control" (which
would also suffice since the United States fully exercises sovereign
power, jurisdiction, and control at Guantanamo Bay over the detainees).
In any event, the statute's word "jurisdiction" is met by the treaty
(i.e., the United States has "complete jurisdiction and control" and is
fully exercising it) as well as by the status of the United States as occu-
pying power with jurisdiction and control. Furthermore, there is a long
history of cases allowing the use of habeas corpus with respect to U.S.
nationals and foreign accused situated outside U.S. sovereign territory
and outside the territory where a particular district court sits.69 Thus, the
statute cannot be so narrowly read as to limit habeas corpus to circum-
stances where a petitioner is physically located within a territory in
which the district court sits or within "sovereign territory" of the United
States. Indeed, "jurisdiction" can be extraterritorial, and should be inter-
67. Indeed, ultimate "sovereignty" is retained by the people of the United States, but the
government exercises delegated sovereign power here or abroad. See U.S. CONST., pmbl.,
amends. IX, X; PAUST, supra note 62, at 329-31, 333-35, and references cited.
68. See Paust, supra note 1, at 25 & n.70 (discussing the treaty regime providing "com-
plete jurisdiction and control" by the United States over Guantanamo Bay). Cuba merely has
"ultimate sovereignty" under the treaty and, by implication, the U.S. must also have some
form of sovereignty or sovereign power by treaty. See id. Thus it is misleading to state that
"Cuba explicitly retained sovereignty." Coalition of Clergy, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1049. Prior to
the treaty, the United States had been an occupying power of Cuba.
69. See, e.g., Exparte Hayes, 414 U.S. 1327, 1328-29 (1973) (granting habeas review to
U.S. serviceman stationed in Germany); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278, 278-79 (1960)
(civilian employee of the U.S. Army, stationed in France, convicted of a capital offense);
McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guaglairdo, 361 U.S. 281, 282-83 (1960) (same, for non-
capital cases); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 4 (1957) (dependents of U.S. military personnel
stationed abroad); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 13 n.3 (1955) (Air Force
serviceman "should not have been carried to Korea for trial without a hearing"); Burns v. Wil-
son, 346 U.S. 137, 138-39 (1953) (affirming the availability of habeas review in military cases
but limiting the scope of review); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1,4-8 (1946) (Japanese prisoner
of war under death sentence imposed by a military commission abroad); Nishimura Ekiu v.
United States, 142 U.S. at 660 (alien on a Japanese vessel who had been prevented from land-
ing); United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621, 622-23, 626-30 (1888) (alien on ship in
San Francisco harbor); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884) (alien on U.S. ship
in San Francisco harbor); Kinnell v. Warner, 356 F. Supp. 779, 780-81 (D. Haw. 1973) (Navy
serviceman at sea aboard U.S. aircraft carrier); see also Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S.
180, 183 (1956) (granting habeas review to an excluded alien without "entry"); Chen v. Car-
roll, 858 F. Supp. 569, 573 (E.D. Va. 1994) (same).
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preted with respect to international law.7° The statute's use of the word
relates to the jurisdiction of a court.
Moreover, federal statutes must be interpreted consistently with in-
ternational law and, in case of an unavoidable clash between a federal
statute and international law, international law will prevail unless there is
a clear and unequivocal intent of Congress to override international law.7'
72In this case, international law requires the availability of habeas corpus
and there is no clear and unequivocal intent of Congress to override in-
ternational law. Even if there had been such an intent, international law
concerning the right to habeas corpus would prevail under either the
"rights under treaties" exception (guaranteeing the primacy of "rights
under" a treaty)73 or the "war powers" exception (guaranteeing the pri-
macy of international law in the context of war)74 to the "last in time"
rule.
At the time of this writing, Coalition of Clergy is on appeal to the
Ninth Circuit and other petitions have been filed on behalf of the
detainees at Guantanamo. 75 Thus, the Ninth Circuit and other federal
courts have an opportunity to read the word "jurisdiction" in the habeas
70. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 62, at 387-88.
71. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984);
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963);
Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933); United States v. Payne, 264 U.S. 446, 448
(1924); Chew Heong, 112 U.S. at 539-40, 549-50; The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
64, 118 (1804) ("[a]n Act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of na-
tions if any other possible construction remains, and, consequently, can never be construed to
violate... rights... further than is warranted by the law of nations... ") (emphasis added);
Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 43 (1801); United States v. Palestine Liberation Org.,
695 F. Supp. 1456, 1465, 1468 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); PAUST, supra note 62, at 99, 105, 107-08,
418; PAUST, FITZPATRICK &VAN DYKE, supra note 62, at 142, 345-59.
72. See supra Part II.
73. See, e.g., Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 32 (1899); Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.)
211, 247 (1872); Reichart v. Felps, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 160, 165-66 (1867); Wilson v. Wall, 73
U.S. (6 Wall.) 83, 89 (1867); Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 749, 755 (1835);
PAUST, supra note 62, at 86-87, 99, 116-17; s'ee also The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
at 118.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 622 (1931) (dictum) (interna-
tional law imposes qualifications and limitations in the context of war that bind Congress);
Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 314-16 (1870) (Field, J., dissenting) ("The
war powers of the government have not express limitation in the Constitution, and the only
limitation to which their exercise is subject is the Law of Nations ... The power to prosecute
war ... is a power to prosecute war according to the law of nations, and not in violation of
that law. The power to make rules ... is ... subject to the condition that they are within the
law of nations. There is a limit ... imposed by the law of nations, and [it] is no less binding
upon Congress than if the limitation were written in the Constitution."); 11 Op. Att'y Gen.
297, 299-300 (1865) (Congress cannot abrogate or authorize an infraction of the laws of war,
nor can the Executive); PAUST, supra note 62, at 88, 95, 99, 120; see also Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S.
(4 DalI.) 37, 43 (1800) (opinion of Chase, J.) (war's "extent and operations are.., restricted
and regulated by the ... law of nations").
75. See, e.g., Shafiq Rassul v. Bush, No. CV: 02-0299 (CKK)(D.D.C. 2002).
Spring 20021
Michigan Journal of International Law
statute far less restrictively and in a manner that mirrors other judicial
decisions recognizing the propriety of habeas corpus petitions with
respect to individuals located outside the territory of the United States
and that allows the United States to comply with international law. By
granting habeas review, one does not guarantee a particular decision on
the merits of a claim. For example, if a person can be lawfully detained
without trial,76 the granting of habeas review simply assures judicial
consideration of the lawfulness of an executive decision to detain the
petitioner. Yet, judicial consideration would save the United States from
one of the numerous violations of international law implicated by the
Military Order and DOD Rules.77
VIII. CONCLUSION
Implementation of the President's Military Order and the ad hoc
DOD rules of procedure and evidence created on March 21st will neces-
sarily involve serious and patent violations of human rights, the laws of
war, and various other international laws. Various rules of procedure and
evidence, if not patently illegal, are problematic. The military commis-
sion and "review" processes that have been designed are not in the best
interests of the United States. Their use may give rise to state responsi-
bility of the United States under international law, and also to individual
criminal78 and civil79 responsibility for those who have designed or im-
plemented the system or who are otherwise complicit in violations of
human rights, laws of war, and other international laws. What resonates
more than details of deprivation, intended or foreseen, is the grating,
mean-spirited, and ultimately anti-American tone of the entire effort.
76. See supra Part II.
77. Additionally, since the Executive cannot suspend habeas corpus without approval
from Congress, following the Military Order and DOD Rules would threaten the balance and
separation of powers and would be unconstitutional. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298 (2001)
(there is a "longstanding rule requiring a clear statement of congressional intent to repeal
habeas jurisdiction"); see Paust, supra note 1, at 21-26. Thus, the independence of the judici-
ary and the separation of powers can be preserved only by allowing habeas review in spite of
the Military Order and DOD Rules to the contrary.
78. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 4 n. 12, 10 n.18, 28 n.81.
79. See, e.g., Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994); Federal Tort Claims Act,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1994). See generally JORDAN J. PAUST, M. CHERIF BAS-
SIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 34, at 849-50; Jordan J. Paust, Suing Saddam: Private Remedies
for War Crimes and Hostage-Taking, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 351, 360-70, 378 (1991).
[Vol. 23:677
